Counterfeit electronics have recently been discovered to be an insidious problem within the supply chain for commercial and military applications. See, for example, Pelofsky, J., in Reuters. Thomson Reuters: Washington D.C., Tuesday, Oct. 26, 2010 edn., 2010, and Ukman, W. W. a. J., in Washington Post. Katharine Weymouth: Washington D.C., 2011. Illicit electronic components have been discovered in the inventories of several distributors and even installed in commercial and military products. Tracking components and tracing the validity of their origins are complicated by the diffuse nature of the supply chain, with its multiple distributors and manufacturers. The problem is compounded by the long times in service for military systems and, by comparison, the relatively short service lives of consumer electronic components. In particular, requirements to maintain and repair military systems create a need for integrated circuits (ICs) at times well after the manufacturing period of the original parts: such situations are ripe for counterfeiting.
Illicit or counterfeit electronic components include a broad category of devices that can range from the correct unit with a more recent date code to lower-specification or non-working systems with altered names, manufacturers and date codes. The term “counterfeit electronics” primarily refers to devices that have been mislabeled or relabeled to suggest higher manufacturing specifications (i.e. military spec) or newer manufacture dates. These chips typically will pass basic functionality tests, as they are often the correct type of device, but are outdated or of lower specification. One example of counterfeit electronic components is integrated circuits (ICs) that have been relabeled.
One relabeling technique is known as “blacktopping”. The blacktopping process begins with removal of the original IC surface, along with the original lettering, typically by abrasive means. Then, a new surface (called ‘blacktop’ in view of its typical coloration) is applied to the IC, and fraudulent re-lettering with updated specifications, date (of manufacture) codes, etc., is applied, by a method such as ink printing or laser etching.
Current methodologies to detect counterfeits include visual inspection with microscopy by expert users and solvent testing for residues. These techniques, while effective, are time-consuming and rely on a skilled operator to both perform and interpret the results. More advanced microscopy techniques, such as scanning electron microscopy and scanning acoustic microscopy, are utilized along with X-ray techniques, such as imaging X-ray techniques to detect die shape and size irregularities and fluorescence X-ray techniques to detect usage of non-qualified materials (metals) in lead-solder coatings (e.g., for “tinning” of leads). These advanced techniques provide detailed information about potentially counterfeit chips. However, the instrumentation for these techniques is very expensive (>$100K), requires highly skilled operators, and is very slow, taking, for example, more than 5 minutes per test to interpret results for each chip.
Thus, there is a need within the supply chain itself and extending into the consumer-parts community for rapid but reliable screening techniques to detect the presence of blacktopped components; i.e., for analytical methodologies that can make sampling and analysis of the component surfaces more nearly “real time.”